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Bank work experience versus political connections: 
Which matters for bank loan financing? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines how bank lending decisions are affected either by executives’ 
connections with banks, through their former banking experience, or by their political 
connections with governments, using a sample of bank loans granted to Chinese listed non-
SOEs from 2003 to 2010. We find that bank loans are more closely related to profitability for 
firms with bank connections, while firms’ political connections weaken this relationship. We 
further find that the influence of bank connections is more significant for firms from less 
supported industries or less developed regions. Furthermore, firms with bank connections are 
less likely to become financially distressed after the initiation of their bank loans and 
experience higher future stock returns, while firms with political connections experience the 
opposite outcome. Overall, our results indicate that in the context of a relationship-based 
economy like China, firms’ connections with banks create value by alleviating information 
asymmetry and improving banks’ lending decisions, while political connections result in 
capital misallocation and subsequent deterioration in performance.      
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1. Introduction 
Recent literature has documented that the bank-firm relationship is valuable for firms’ 
bank loan financing. One strand of literature emphasizes the importance of social connections 
between bank executives and borrowers, since this social connection enables banks to 
catalyse the borrowers’ proprietary and specific information and reduce banks’ monitoring 
costs (Engelberg et al., 2012; Haselmann et al., 2013). Another strand of literature, with 
respect to relationship banking/lending, suggests that banks may invest in costly information 
production by building a close relationship over time with borrowers (Boot and Thakor, 
1994). Relationship lending allows banks to learn about borrowers more easily at a lower 
cost. However, there is mixed evidence regarding whether relationship lending is beneficial 
for borrowers. Some studies argue that relationship lending can reduce banks’ monitoring 
costs and benefit borrowers with lower financing costs (Boot, 2000; Behr et al., 2011; 
Bharath et al., 2011), while other studies propose the alternative view that relationship 
lending can lead to firms being locked in, and that banks may seek more rents due to 
monopoly power through increasing financing costs (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Kano et al., 
2011).  
In a departure from previous studies, but complementary to them, our focus is to explore 
another channel through which the bank-firm relationship is built, namely the bank work 
experience of firms’ executives. Through this work experience, executives have built up their 
personal relationship with bank managers in that bank and may even extend their 
relationships to those in other banks. Recent evidence has suggested that firms’ connections 
with banks, accumulated through firm executives’ banking experience, are valuable for firms 
in terms of applying sophisticated financial policies (Custodio and Metzger, 2014) and better 
acquisition decisions (Huang et al., 2014). However, these studies almost exclusively focus 
on developed markets and little is known about the financial implications of the bank-firm 
relationship in China, whose economy is known to be relationship-based. 
Meanwhile, it has also been widely documented that political connections based on 
executives’ close connections with governments bring various benefits to firms in accessing 
financial resources, such as bank loans and equity issuing, through rent seeking from 
government regulations or government lobbying (Cull and Xu, 205; Claessens et al., 2008; 
Faccio, 2010; Li et al., 2008; Houston et al., 2014).  
Overall, there is a clear connection between the influence of political connections and the 
bank-firm relationship (we use the term “bank connections” hereafter) on bank lending. Thus, 
we are interested in investigating the relative impacts of bank connections and political 
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connections on conferring access to bank loans and explaining how banks make lending 
decisions. In particular, this paper intends to answer the question “whether and how do bank 
and political connections affect banks’ lending decisions?” The answer to this question is an 
essential element in gauging firm value and financial implications in a relationship-based 
economy, and may present a complementary perspective to existing literature. Following 
existing studies, we use the sensitivity of the amount of bank loans to firm profitability as the 
proxy for bank lending decision. This is because banks have strong incentives to allocate 
more capital to financially healthy firms, thus reflected by a strong sensitivity of bank loan 
size to firm profitability (Zheng and Zhu, 2013).   
This paper conducts the research using non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) in 
China, because the non-SOE sector in China has provided an ideal institutional environment 
in which to address these issues for several reasons, as explained below.  
First, China’s financial system and banking industry are largely controlled by the state, 
and bank loans are more likely to flow to SOEs than non-SOEs. As a result, non-SOEs face 
many obstacles in trying to access external finance in order to survive (Firth et al., 2009). 
Using China’s non-SOEs as the sample can avoid the diluted effect of state ownership in 
SOEs, and allow us to identify the causal effects of both kinds of connection on firms’ 
financial policies and banks' lending decisions.   
Moreover, there are cross-sectional variations in government supporting policies across 
industries, as every five years the government announces a “Five Year Plan” specifying that 
particular industries will be supported by government policies. There are also cross-sectional 
variations in institutional environments across provinces in China (Fan et al., 2011). Thus the 
Chinese setting provides a good environment and creates cross-sectional variations which 
may shape the effects of bank connections and political connections on banking finance and 
banks’ lending decisions. Such a cross-regional approach within one country makes it 
possible to control for the role of accounting rules, culture and other country-level variables 
(Li et al., 2009). Therefore, an in-depth case study of a particular country’s experience can 
provide a useful complement to cross-country regressions. For all these reasons, our sample 
facilitates this research into exploring the financial implications of bank connections and 
political connections with respect to firms’ banking finance and banks’ lending decisions. 
We conduct analyses at the bank loan level because there are problems of identification 
with firm-level data, since the results could be due to unobserved heterogeneities in firms 
which are correlated with bank lending decisions and connections. Our results show that 
firms with either bank connections or political connections have access to more bank loans. 
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We also find that bank connections can enhance banks’ lending decisions by strengthening 
the positive relationship between bank loan size and firm profitability, while political 
connections weaken this relationship. Our empirical results further show that the effect of 
bank connections is more significant for firms from less supported industries or less 
developed regions. By focusing on subsequent performance, we find that firms with bank 
connections perform better over three-year periods after the initiation of their bank loans, 
while those with political connections perform worse. Additionally, we find that both firm 
and bank shareholders highly value bank loans to firms with bank connections, as reflected 
by higher abnormal returns around bank loan announcements, and discount the value of bank 
loans to firms with political connections. Our main findings are robust to corrections for 
alternative measurements of connections and an alternative sample. Even though the 
endogeneity issue is less likely to be ruled out completely, we have conducted further tests to 
mitigate the endogeneity issue and confirm the robustness of our main results, including 
using the Heckman two stage and propensity score matching methods. These findings suggest 
that bank connections reinforce the use of profitability in allocating capital and create value 
for firms, while political connections are more likely to result in capital misallocation, which 
may reduce firm value.  
Our study is related to several strands of a growing body of literature. First, we 
contribute to literature on the implications of managerial networks for corporate financial 
decisions. Previous studies have examined the effects of bank connections and political 
connections on firms’ bank financing separately, and there is no evidence to compare the 
relative impact of bank connections and political connections. This study fills this gap. In 
particular, while we have confirmed the existing findings that political connections lead to 
more bank loans, our findings indicate that political connections distort capital allocation and 
cause subsequent underperformance after bank loans have been granted. We argue that 
connections with banks, a more direct and specific measurement for bank-firm relationships 
than executives’ political connections, more effectively influence Chinese non-SOEs' success 
in obtaining bank loans, and further improve banks’ lending decisions.  
Secondly, our study adds to the evolving literature on agency problems and information 
asymmetry. We provide evidence from an emerging market that connections between firms 
and banks encourage the transfer of information between them, which results in optimal 
lending contracts, due to either better information flow or more efficient monitoring. 
Furthermore, our study also advances the view that the financial work experience of 
executives/directors matters for firm value and policies (Custodio and Metzger, 2014; Huang 
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et al., 2014), and we provide strong evidence that banking experience matters for firms’ 
financial policies and the enhancement of firm value.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data and methodology; 
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the empirical results; and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional background and development of hypotheses  
In this section we describe the institutional background in China related to our study, and 
develop corresponding hypotheses based on existing theories and China’s institutional 
system. 
2.1 Banking industry and banks' lending decisions  
In the late 1970s the Chinese government launched a significant reform of the banking 
industry by establishing four wholly state-owned banks (the Big Four), which took control of 
all the lending functions of the People’s Bank of China (the central bank). In 1994, three new 
wholly state-owned policy banks
1
 were established, and took over policy lending from the 
Big Four banks. In 1996, joint-stock commercial banks and city banks began to emerge. 
Though more types of banks were starting to emerge locally, the state-owned banks were not 
greatly concerned about the competition, due to the dominance of state ownership and the 
size of their own assets. In 2006, the Chinese government launched banking reforms for these 
state-owned banks in light of the international competition mandated by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The reforms were introduced on several fronts, including transferring 
non-performing loans to newly established asset-management companies, introducing 
strategic investors and public listing. All of these reforms aimed to transform the banks into 
business entities operating on a commercial basis, which has naturally affected the behaviour 
of bank executives and lending decisions.  
Originally, bank loans mainly took the form of credit loans granted to SOEs at low 
interest rates and without any guarantees or collateral, in conformance with lending policy. 
These loans were one of the causes of a higher ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). As this 
market-oriented economic reform deepened, banks became more aware of loan risks, and 
from the 1990s they increasingly demanded guarantees or collateral. According to a survey of 
13 domestic banks between 2000 and 2005, the average collateral requirement for secured 
loans increased from 22% to 32% of all loans granted (Yang and Qian, 2008), of which land 
                                                          
1
 These are the State Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export and 
Import Bank of China.  
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or buildings became the most acceptable form. Banks also demanded the equivalent value of 
fixed assets as collateral before granting loans, especially to privately controlled firms 
(Yeung, 2009). 
In addition, SOEs were favoured over non-SOEs in granting these bank loans (Wei and 
Wang, 1997; Cull and Xu, 2003), with state-owned banks often lending to SOEs for political, 
employment and taxation purposes rather than just profitability. As discussed by Yeung 
(2009), for these banks (the Big Four SOCBs, policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks 
and city banks), the decision to grant loans was often determined by unofficial assessment 
criteria. SOEs tended to receive loans without pledging the necessary collateral because of 
state ownership and implicit government guarantees, while non-SOEs were expected to 
pledge collateral by securing their fixed assets to the equivalent value of the collateral 
required. In other words, banks made a rational decision to bias their lending against non-
SOEs based on the higher risks and higher transaction and risk-evaluation costs.  
2.2 Hypothesis development   
The existing literature proposes explanations for the phenomenon observed in China of 
significant economic growth in the private sector in the presence of formal financing 
discrimination, and suggests that alternative financing channels based on relationships 
support the growth of the private sector (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2013). As information 
asymmetry and the agency problem are the main obstacles to firms’ financing (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977; Sharpe, 1990; Sufi, 2007; Firth et al., 2009), firms have incentives to alleviate 
information asymmetry and conflicts of interest with banks by establishing connections with 
them.  
One way to establish connections is to employ executives with previous work experience 
in banks. These executives may use their expertise and networks to facilitate a firm’s access 
to external financing through the following ways. First, work experience in the banking 
sector allows executives to establish/maintain connections with their former employers or 
even wider connections in the banking industry. In this sense, these executives have acquired 
the necessary skills to effectively communicate with banks and negotiate loan terms. They 
also facilitate firm-specific information that is not publicly available or observable to be 
revealed and shared with banks. This will mitigate information asymmetry and reduce banks’ 
monitoring costs, and lead to more effective monitoring and improved information 
transparency. Secondly, through their career paths, these executives bring professional 
knowledge (such as financing and investment) and sophisticated financial skills with them 
that allow them to adopt other financial decisions to facilitate firms’ access to external 
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financing. Moreover, it is notable that trustworthiness plays a key role in the intensive and 
complex process of communications, which is essential for the effective transfer of 
borrowers' confidential information. When a connection and trust have been established, 
banks have proprietary information on firms, and financial contracting based on relationships 
should occur because there is less information asymmetry and conflict of interest between the 
parties.  
In addition, as argued by Shelifer and Vishny (1997), banks exert effective external 
governance in terms of scrutinizing firms’ projects and creditworthiness when making 
lending decisions. In this line of research, Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013) provide 
empirical evidence that banks use commercial judgments in allocating credit to private firms 
in China. Thus, due to reduced information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between firms 
and banks, banks can make more efficient scrutiny of loan applications and better evaluate 
firms’ future earnings. Therefore, we expect that banks can make optimal lending decisions 
based on the profitability of firms with bank connections. 
H1: Firms’ bank connections strengthen the relationship between bank loan size and 
firm profitability.  
In addition to firms’ bank connections, firms would also like to hire executives/directors 
who have work experience in governments to establish close connections with government, 
and firms that do so are found to be more leveraged and face a lower cost of debt financing 
than their peers (Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Qi et al. 2010; Houston 
et al., 2014). This is particularly true for non-SOEs in China, as they are often denied access 
to bank loans and are subject to heavy government regulations or “extralegal” fees. In such an 
environment, close ties to the government help them overcome these market and state failures 
and avoid ideological discrimination (Li et al., 2008). However, compared with the effects of 
firms’ bank connections, political connections may have the opposite influence and be value-
destroying. Specifically, government officials exert significant pressure on local state-owned 
banks to extend credits and preferential treatment to politically connected firms. In this sense, 
banks are reluctant to make these politically based loans; thus political connections do not 
necessarily improve the quality of either corporate governance or information transparency in 
these politically connected non-SOEs. Though political connections may bring more bank 
loans to politically connected firms, these politically based loans are granted for political 
rather than economic reasons, regardless of firm profitability, and could cause capital 
misallocation (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). As this politically based lending is not aligned with 
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banks’ interests, banks are unlikely to exert effective monitoring, which may further weaken 
banks’ lending decisions. Therefore, we construct the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firms’ political connections weaken the relationship between bank loan size and 
firm profitability.  
3. Data and variables 
3.1 The sample selection 
The sample we use to conduct the empirical analysis is collected from the Bank Loan 
dataset of the Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR) from 2003 
to 2010. As new accounting and auditing standards were applied to all listed firms in China in 
2002, we start our sample from 2003. This Bank Loan dataset includes the information for 
each announcement, such as loan amount, interest rate, loan maturity, lending bank, whether 
the loan is guaranteed by a third party and whether the loan is secured by collateral. 
To examine the influence of both bank and political connections on the bank lending 
decisions, we initially assemble 807 bank loan announcements. We then delete 10 contracts 
with missing information on the loan amounts, 25 contracts granted to non-SOEs in the 
financial industry and 23 contracts granted to non-SOEs flagged with ST or *ST
2
, leaving 
749 loan contract observations. Then, matching with the data from the sub-database of 
balance sheets, cash-flow statements and income statements, we also delete those 
observations for which information on the corporate governance and firm characteristics of 
these non-SOEs is missing. We are left with 730 loan contract observations where a loan was 
granted to our sample firms. To avoid the influence of outliers, we also winsorize the top and 
bottom 1% of all continuous variables. 
According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Chinese listed firms 
are required to disclose those bank loans whose transaction is more than 10% of equity book 
value and those that are more than 10 million RMB. Therefore, a sample of bank loans we 
collect includes both large bank loans which are disclosed compulsorily and small loans 
which are disclosed voluntarily. These bank loans were granted to 185 listed non-SOEs and 
account for 16.78% of all 1102 listed non-SOEs by the end of 2010. A question which then 
naturally arises is to what extent this sample is representative of the population of all non-
SOEs. To demonstrate the representativeness of our sample, we follow Huang et al. (2012) 
by comparing certain characteristics between our sample and all listed non-SOEs (Table 1). 
                                                          
2
 ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to listed firms that have already had negative net profits for two 
consecutive years. *ST refers to listed firms that already had negative net profits for three consecutive years and 
thus have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges. 
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With regard to profitability, the average return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) for 
our sample are 3.77% and 8.46%, respectively, which are quite comparable to 3.51% and 
8.76% for all listed non-SOEs; the differences are insignificant. Leverage for our sample 
firms is 50.48%, which is quite close to the level for all listed non-SOEs (49.48%). We also 
observe that both employee number and largest shareholding do not significantly differ 
between our sample firms and all listed non-SOEs. Overall, our sample characteristics are not 
significantly different from the population of non-SOEs in terms of profitability, leverage, 
firm size or ownership structure.  
Table 1. Comparison of firm characteristics between non-SOEs in our sample and all listed non-SOEs 
 Our sample non-SOEs All listed non-SOEs Difference test (t-value) 
Return on assets (ROA) 3.77% 3.51% 0.26%(0.98) 
Return on sales (ROS) 8.46% 8.76% -0.30%(-0.47) 
Leverage 50.48% 49.48% 1.00%(0.17) 
Employee number 1516.0 2086.7 -570.7(-1.33) 
Largest shareholding 33.32% 35.22% -1.90%(-1.25) 
Observations 730 1,102  
  
3.2 Measuring bank connections and political connections 
We manually collect information on the career paths and work experience of executives 
and directors (including CEO, Chairman and other executive directors) for each firm each 
year by searching press and online news resources, and combine this information with brief  
résumés provided by the CSMAR database. We consider a firm to have a bank connection if 
at least one executive has work experience in either commercial banks or investment banks. 
To make sure that bank-connected individuals influence corporate strategy effectively, we 
carefully identify their work positions and only consider governors, vice-governors, managers 
and vice-managers of banks or departments of banks. In our definition we consider all banks 
at different levels, such as headquarters, branches and sub-branches. In our sample, all 
executives with banking experience are former bankers and we find none of them are 
currently holding a senior position in any bank. In this sense, our bank connections can rule 
out a complicated situation of conflicts of interest that arise when a current banker is sitting 
on a firm’s board.        
In the spirit of Fan et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011a), we consider a firm to have a 
political connection if at least one executive is any of the following, formerly or currently: (1) 
government official; (2) military official; (3) member of the standing committee of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC); or (4) member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC).  
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Empirically, we create a dummy variable, Bank, which equals 1 if a firm has bank 
connections and 0 otherwise. We also create a dummy variable, Political, which equals 1 if a 
firm has political connections and 0 otherwise. In the empirical analysis, while we almost 
exclusively rely on these dummy variables capturing the presence of either bank-connected or 
politically connected executives, we also conduct robustness tests using the proportion of 
bank-connected or politically connected executives/directors
3
. All variables, including those 
of key interest and control variables, are defined in Table 2. 
Table 2. Variables and definitions 
Name of Variable Definition of variable 
Loansize Log of the amount of bank loans. 
Bank connections (Bank) 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive/director (including the 
chairman of the board, CEO and other directors) was a former officer 
of a bank, and 0 otherwise. 
Political connections (Political) A dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive/director (including the 
chairman of the board, CEO and other directors) was any of the 
following formerly or currently: (1) government official; (2) military 
official; (3) member of the standing committee of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC); (4) member of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); (5) member of All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). The variable is equal 
to 0 otherwise. 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / Total assets. 
Firm_age (Firm age) Natural log of years since the firm was established. 
Firm size (Size) Natural log of firm total assets. 
Leverage Total debts / Total assets. 
Tangibility (Tangible) Tangible assets / Total assets. 
Cash-flow volatility (Volatility) The volatility of cash flows for the previous three years. 
Employee Natural log of number of employees. 
Independent director (Indep) Ratio of independent directors to total directors. 
Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 
otherwise. 
Bigfour A dummy variable equal to 1 if the lending bank is one of the Big 
Four and 0 for other banks. 
Repeat A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is a repeat borrowing 
obtained from a specific bank and 0 for the first borrowing. 
Executive age (Exeage) The age of the connected executives. If the firm is neither bank-
connected nor politically connected, this value is defined as the age of 
the chairman. 
Executive tenure (Tenure) The number of years that the connected executives have held their 
positions in the firms. If the firm is neither bank-connected nor 
politically connected, this value is defined as the tenure of the 
chairman. 
Executive education (Education) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the connected executive has a degree 
of master or above and 0 otherwise. If the firm is neither bank-
connected nor politically connected, this value is defined as the 
education level of the chairman. 
Bank ROA (BankROA) ROA of lending banks. 
Bank board size (Bankboard) Log of number of directors on boards of lending banks. 
 
                                                          
3
 According to Chen et al. (2011a), the effectiveness of independent directors in influencing corporate policy is 
debatable because they are not appointed voluntarily by firms but required to be on the board in accordance with 
the CSRC rule. Thus, we do not consider independent directors in our main empirical analysis.  
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3.3 Models and estimation 
We perform empirical analysis to test our hypotheses H1 and H2 by examining the 
effects of both types of connection on the relationship between bank loan size and firm 
profitability. In the spirit of the equations used by existing studies (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et 
al., 2013; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we develop the following equation regarding the 
determinants of bank loan size, and include proxies for both types of connection as 
independent variables. Then, following the discussion that bank loans granted should depend 
on the borrowing firm’s profitability (Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we use the 
sensitivity of newly granted bank loans to firms’ profitability as the proxy for the bank’s 
lending decision, where strong sensitivity indicates an optimal lending decision. The baseline 
model is expressed as follows: 
itititit
itititit
itititit
itititit
ititititit
BankboardBankROAEducation
TenureExeageRepeatBigfour
DualityIndepEmployeeVolatility
TangibleLeverageSizeFirmage
ROAROAConnectionConnectionLoansize










181716
15141312
111098
7654
3210
                      
                      
                      
                      
*
      (1) 
where Loansize is the bank loan size, defined as the log of the amount of the newly granted 
bank loans. Connection is the indicator of our key variables, including Bank and Political. 
ROA is return on assets, the proxy for firm profitability, calculated as the ratio of net income 
to total assets, and we include one interaction term between Connection and ROA to test the 
effect of previous work experience on banks' lending decisions. In this equation, we also 
control for other variables of firm, executive and bank characteristics which are defined in 
Table 2. We also include industry and year fixed effects in the regression estimation. 
In the empirical analysis, we first separately enter the bank connection dummy and 
political connection dummy to examine their individual effect. We then put them together to 
test our main hypotheses, comparing their individual effects and examining which effect is 
more significant.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the study sample period from 2003 to 2010, 
including all variables used for the univariate and multivariate tests. The summary shows that 
for all bank loan announcements we collected, the average log of bank loan amount is 17.48. 
With regard to both bank connections and political connections, we find that 17.26% of total 
observations have bank connections, and 40.41% have political connections. These indicate 
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that among the 730 observations in our sample, there are 126 (=730*17.26%) observations of 
firms which have bank connections and 295 (=730*40.41%) observations of firms which 
have political connections. Moreover, in our sample, we also find that there are 29 
observations of firms which have both bank connections and political connections. We also 
conduct the correlations between each pair of independent variables to make sure that none of 
them are highly correlated with each other. From the unreported correlation matrix, the 
correlation coefficients are all less than 0.25, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in the regression analysis. 
Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables 
 Mean Median Bottom 
quartile 
Upper quartile Observations 
Loansize 17.48 17.50 16.52 18.42 730 
Bank connections (Bank) 17.26% 0 0 0 730 
Political connections (Political) 40.41% 0 0 1 730 
Return on assets (ROA) 3.77% 2.96% 1.01% 5.32% 730 
Firm_age (Firmage) 1.72 2.07 1.09 2.30 730 
Firm size (Size) 21.43 21.11 20.74 22.21 730 
Leverage 50.48% 51.95% 41.68% 66.52% 730 
Tangible 47.05% 41.04% 29.55% 65.31% 730 
Cash-flow volatility (Volatility) 1.78 1.79 1.72 1.80 730 
Employee 6.30 6.49 4.85 7.52 730 
Independent director (Indep) 25.47% 33.33% 10.00% 36.36% 730 
Duality 12.19% 0 0 0 730 
Bigfour 43.49% 0 0 1 730 
Repeat 68.09% 1 0 1 730 
Exeage 43.92 44 40 51 730 
Tenure 2.26 1.87 1.67 3 730 
Education 53.6% 1 0 1 730 
BankROA 1.08% 0.97% 0.32% 1.75% 730 
Bankboard 2.56 2.64 2.39 2.70 730 
All variables are defined in Table 2. 
Table 4 summarizes the distributions of the total 730 bank loans included in our sample 
according to year, industry, the number of banks that granted loans and number of non-SOEs 
that received the loans, and these distributions are reported in three panels separately. Panel A 
shows that more than 50% of total loans were granted after 2007, Panel B shows that most of 
the loans were granted to the firms from the manufacturing industry and Panel C shows that a 
majority of loans were granted by the Big Four banks. Panel D shows that more than 50% of 
banks granted only one bank loan during our sample and most of the firms in our sample 
have received less than five bank loans.    
Table 4. Distributions of bank loans by year, industry, bank types and number of banks and number of 
non-SOEs 
 Number of bank loans % of the total sample  
Panel A: Distribution of bank loans by year 
2003 90 12.33 
2004 52 7.12 
2005 26 3.56 
2006 34 4.66 
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2007 116 15.89 
2008 164 22.47 
2009 160 21.92 
2010 88 12.05 
Total 730 100 
Panel B: Distribution of bank loans by industry sector 
Agriculture and fishery 13 1.78 
Mining 23 3.15 
Manufacturing 499 68.36 
Public Utility 15 2.05 
Construction 11 1.51 
Wholesale and retail 12 1.64 
Transportation 47 6.44 
Hotel and catering industry 38 5.21 
Technology services 12 1.64 
Real estate 13 1.78 
Social services 47 6.44 
Total 730 100 
Panel C: Distribution of bank loans by bank types 
Shenzhen Development Bank 10 1.37 
Three policy banks 12 1.64 
Huaxia Bank 15 2.05 
China Guangfa Bank 20 2.74 
China Everbright Bank 22 3.01 
Industrial Bank 27 3.70 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 34 4.66 
China Merchants Bank 35 4.79 
China Minsheng Bank 41 5.62 
China CITIC Bank 49 6.71 
Bank of Communications 57 7.81 
China Construction Bank 58 7.95 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 67 9.18 
Agricultural Bank of China 75 10.27 
Bank of China 90 12.33 
Other banks and financial institutions 118 16.16 
Total 730 100 
 
Panel D: Breakdown of number of bank loans by the number of banks granting the loans and number of non-
SOEs receiving the loans 
Number of bank loans Number of banks granting loans % of total banks 
1 34 51.52 
2 8 12.12 
3 2 3.03 
4 2 3.03 
5 2 3.03 
7 1 1.52 
10 2 3.03 
12 1 1.52 
15 1 1.52 
20 1 1.52 
22 1 1.52 
27 2 3.03 
>34 9 13.64 
Total 66 100 
Number of bank loans Number of non-SOEs receiving loans % of total non-SOEs 
1 85 45.95 
2 29 15.68 
3 19 10.27 
4 11 5.95 
5 15 8.11 
6 5 2.80 
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8 3 1.62 
9 1 0.54 
10 3 1.62 
11 2 1.08 
12 3 1.62 
>13 9 4.86 
Total 185 100 
This table presents information on the distributions of bank loans in our sample from 2003 to 2010. Panels A to 
C present the distributions of bank loans according to year, industry and bank types. Panel D presents 
information on the distributions of bank loans according to the number of banks that have granted loans and 
number of non-SOEs that have received bank loans in our sample from 2003 to 2010.   
 
To provide some preliminary evidence for our hypotheses, Table 5 presents the 
univariate tests of bank loan size and other firm characteristics for firms with and without 
bank connections (Panel A), and with and without political connections (Panel B). The results 
in Panel A show that bank loan size is significantly higher for firms with bank connections 
than for those without. This result supports our hypothesis that bank connections can help 
firms obtain more bank loans. We further find that firms with bank connections have a higher 
leverage level, though the difference is insignificant. In Panel B, which focuses on political 
connections, we observe quite similar results for our key variables and firm characteristics, 
while the leverage level between firms with and without political connections is insignificant.  
Table 5. Univariate tests of all variables 
Panel A: Difference tests between firms with and without bank connections 
 With bank connections Without bank connections Difference tests 
Loansize 18.55  17.25 1.30***(2.51) 
ROA 4.45% 3.63% 0.82%(1.51) 
Firmage 1.78 1.71 0.07(0.91) 
Size 21.04 21.50 -0.46***(-4.53) 
Leverage 52.09% 50.15% 1.94%(1.13) 
Tangible 40.78% 48.36% -7.58%***(-3.07) 
Volatility 1.79 1.78 0.01(1.56) 
Employee 6.41 6.29 0.12(0.78) 
Indep 28.64% 24.82% 3.82%**(2.33) 
Duality 11.11% 12.42% -1.31%(-0.41) 
Bigfour 42.73% 43.65% -0.92%*(-1.81) 
Repeat 81.75% 65.24% 16.51%***(4.16) 
Exeage 47.53 43.17 4.36***(6.87) 
Tenure 2.67 2.18 0.49***(2.77) 
Education 39.68 55.29 -15.61***(-3.23) 
BankROA 1.09% 1.08% 0.01%(0.17) 
Bankboard 2.55 2.56 -0.01(-1.00) 
Observations 126 604  
Panel B: Difference test between firms with and without political connections 
 With political connections Without political connections Difference tests 
Loansize 17.73 17.32 0.41**(2.06) 
ROA  4.02% 3.60% 0.42%(1.04) 
Firmage 1.87 1.62 0.25***(4.55) 
Size 21.31 21.51 -0.20**(-2.33) 
Leverage 51.76% 49.62% 2.14%(1.31) 
Tangible 42.93% 49.85% -6.92%***(-3.65) 
Volatility  1.79 1.77 0.02**(2.47) 
Employee 6.09 6.46 -0.37***(-3.31) 
Indep 24.06% 26.43% -2.37%*(-1.82) 
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Duality 11.52% 12.64% -1.12%(-0.45) 
Bigfour 44.72% 42.23% 2.49%*(1.89) 
Repeat 74.24% 63.91% 10.33%***(3.00) 
Exeage 46.33 42.27 4.06***(7.70) 
Tenure 2.16 2.33 -0.17*(-1.64) 
Education 38.31 62.29 -23.98***(-6.54) 
BankROA 1.21% 0.99% 0.22%***(3.72) 
Bankboard 2.55 2.56 -0.01(-0.30) 
Observations 295 435  
All variables are defined in Table 2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Bank connections, political connections and banks' lending decisions 
In this section, we perform regression analysis to examine how bank lending behaviour 
varies across firms with and without bank connections/political connections. The estimation 
results of equation (1) are shown in Table 6. Columns 1 and 2 focus on bank connections and 
political connections, separately, and column 3 combines them. Across three specifications, 
we find that the estimated coefficients of Bank are higher than those of Political, suggesting 
that bank connections have more significant effects on accessing bank loans relative to 
political connections.   
In Table 6, the variables we are concerned about are the interaction terms. In particular in 
column 1, the coefficient on Bank*ROA is 0.77, significant at the 1% level (t-value is 2.87). 
This result supports our hypothesis H1 that bank connections are able to encourage firm-
specific information transfer and reduce the credit risk faced by banks, so that banks can 
access more proprietary information about non-SOEs. Bank-connected executives with 
financial skills can also help firms to adopt sophisticated financial decisions to facilitate more 
access to external bank loans and improve firm profitability. Thus banks can lend optimally 
to non-SOEs by better evaluating their profitability. In column 2, we observe that political 
connections exert an opposite effect on banks' lending decisions, reflected by the negative 
coefficient on Political*ROA. In column 3, which includes both bank connections and 
political connections, their effects on banks' lending decisions are consistent with those in the 
first two columns. Our findings are consistent with those reported by Zheng and Zhu (2013), 
who argue that lending based on political connections reduces the efficiency of banks’ 
monitoring. The estimated coefficients on control variables are similar to those reported in 
previous tables.  
Overall, the results from Table 6 provide supportive evidence for our hypotheses H1 and 
H2 that bank connections can enhance bank lending decisions while political connections 
distort banks’ capital allocation. In general, we argue that, though both bank connections and 
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political connections can facilitate access to more bank loans, they matter in different ways 
and result in different economic implications. Specifically, bank-connected executives have 
financial skills, and can reduce information asymmetry and potential credit risks, so that 
banks are encouraged to grant loans to financially healthier firms, especially those with bank 
connections that can make banks better informed. However, politically based lending is 
usually granted under political pressure, which is unrelated to firm profitability and less likely 
to be accompanied by bank monitoring.   
Table 6. Effect of bank connections and political connections on bank lending decisions 
Dependent variable                                                              Loansize  
Bank 0.40***(3.00)  0.42***(3.22) 
Bank*ROA 0.77***(2.87)  0.80***(2.90) 
Political  0.29**(2.01) 0.34**(2.39) 
Political*ROA  -0.79**(-2.47) -1.51***(-2.90) 
ROA 1.42**(2.38) 1.04**(2.08) 1.42**(2.37) 
Firmage 0.04***(2.96) 0.05***(3.76) 0.03***(2.59) 
Size 0.62***(12.88) 0.62***(12.74) 0.63**(13.09) 
Leverage -0.43*(-1.78) -0.39(-1.61) -0.51**(-2.12) 
Tangible -0.26(-1.25) -0.27(-1.32) -0.20(-1.00) 
Volatility -0.19***(-5.24) -0.20***(-5.62) -0.18***(-5.07) 
Employee 0.13***(3.60) 0.15***(4.17) 0.13***(3.56) 
Indep 1.16*(1.70) 1.23*(1.80) 1.03(1.51) 
Duality -0.07(-0.47) -0.07(-0.51) -0.05(-0.35) 
Bigfour 0.24**(1.96) 0.06(0.57) 0.33***(2.57) 
Repeat 0.48***(4.73) 0.44***(4.33) 0.52***(4.97) 
Exeage 0.04***(6.30) 0.05***(7.22) 0.04***(5.73) 
Tenure 0.02(0.62) 0.05(1.43) 0.03(0.99) 
Education 0.04(0.37) 0.02(0.16) 0.03(0.36) 
BankROA 6.47(1.17) 7.99(1.44) 6.86(1.24) 
Bankboard 0.01(0.02) 0.28(0.60) 0.11(0.25) 
Constant 2.77*(1.77) 1.80(1.13) 2.26(1.43) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.40 0.38 0.39 
Observations 730 730 730 
This table reports the effects of bank connections and political connections on banks' lending decisions. The 
dependent variable is the log of the amount of bank loans. All other variables are defined as in Table 2.    
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Additional evidence 
4.3.1 Industrial and regional variations 
As the objective of firms in building bank or political connections is to justify their 
existence and overcome market failure under the poor institutional environment, the effects 
of both bank and political connections depend to a large degree on the extent of the 
government's industry-supporting policies and levels of market development. If bank and 
political connections are effective in sheltering firms from ideological discrimination, their 
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effects will be expected to diminish if firms are operating in industries that receive support 
through government policy or in regions with relatively developed markets. 
Firms in our sample operate in different industries and regions, and thus are subject to 
different market conditions with respect to government policy and market development. On 
the one hand, every five years the Chinese government announces a Five Year Plan 
specifying that some specific industries will be more supported or favoured by government 
policy. As our sample ranges from 2003 to 2010, which covers the tenth (2001 to 2005) and 
the eleventh (2006 to 2010) Five Year Plans, we carefully identify the supported industries 
during the period of each plan, and the remainder are identified as less supported industries 
(See Appendix 1 for detailed classification). On the other hand, economic development varies 
across provincial regions and government retains significant control over the economy in less 
developed regions. In this study, we use the market development index filed by Fan et al. 
(2011) to measure the level of regional development, and a higher value of the market 
development index indicates a higher level of regional development. Therefore, we expect 
that firms from non-supported industries or less developed regions may have more incentives 
to employ connected executives in order to be favourably treated. We therefore take 
advantage of this difference in industry policy and market development levels to investigate 
where connections are more important to firms’ bank loan finance.  
Empirically, we partition our full sample into subsamples based on whether the industry 
is supported and the median value of the market development index. Then, we re-estimate the 
main regression for these subsamples and report the results in Table 7. Overall, we find that 
the expected coefficients of our key interaction variables still hold for the sample of firms 
from less supported industries and less developed regions. These results lend support to our 
main hypothesis that bank connections and political connections are effective in helping firms 
to access external bank loans, but they lead to opposite patterns of capital allocation 
efficiency, especially for those firms that face some discrimination in obtaining external 
finance.   
Table 7. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions across industries and regions 
Dependent variable is Loansize 
 More supportive 
industry 
Less supportive 
industry 
More developed 
regions 
Less developed regions 
Bank 0.20 
(1.10) 
0.47** 
(1.99) 
0.22*** 
(2.92) 
0.51*** 
(2.90) 
Bank*ROA 0.95 
(1.00) 
1.49*** 
(3.55) 
0.55*** 
(2.61) 
6.07** 
(2.11) 
Political 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.48* 
(1.95) 
0.30* 
(1.80) 
0.85*** 
(2.85) 
Political*ROA -3.38 -1.78*** -0.99 -11.57*** 
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(-1.07) (-2.63) (-0.55) (-2.93) 
Chow tests  4.73**
a
  3.72**
a
 
  3.55**
b
  6.65***
b
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.46 
Observations 392 338 384 346 
This table reports the results of bank connections and political connections on bank loan finance in less 
supported versus more supported industries and in more developed versus less developed regions. Other control 
variables are also included in the regressions. Variables are defined as in previous tables. 
a
 and 
b
 are F-statistics values of Chow tests, revealing the significance of the difference in the coefficients on the 
Bank*ROA and Political *ROA between firms from two subsamples.   
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3.2 Channels through which both connections work
4
 
In our main hypothesis development, we argued that bank connections are helpful in 
mitigating information asymmetry, lead firms to better access external bank loans and can 
improve capital allocation efficiency, while political connections can lead firms to better 
access external bank loans through government intervention, which may reduce capital 
allocation efficiency. If our arguments are valid, we expect to see that the effect of bank 
connections is more pronounced in firms with a higher level of information asymmetry, and 
the effect of political connections is more pronounced in firms located in regions with a lower 
level of law enforcement. In this section, we aim to provide direct empirical evidence to 
validate our arguments.  
First, following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), we use the number of analysts 
following a firm to measure the level of a firm’s information asymmetry, and a larger number 
of analysts indicates a lower level of information asymmetry. Second, we use the ranking 
indicator of enforcing contracts provided by the Doing Business in China 2008 (World Bank 
Group) to measure the level of law enforcement. It is noted that this indicator is measured at 
the capital city level of each province, and we take these values of indicators as the measure 
of law enforcement at the provincial level
5
.  Then, we divide our full sample into two 
subsamples based on the median value of information asymmetry and the median value of 
law enforcement, and re-estimate the main regressions for these subsamples.    
The results reported in Table 8 confirm our previous discussions. For example, when we 
compare the results from the first two columns, we find that the coefficients of Bank*ROA 
are positive and significantly higher for firms with a high level of information asymmetry. 
                                                          
4
 We thank the reviewer for suggesting this test. 
5
 We also use one composite index of the market development index by Fan et al. (2011), the legal environment 
composite index, to measure the level of law enforcement. As the ranking of provinces is the same based on 
either the market development index or the composite index, we obtain the same results as those reported in the 
last two columns in Table 7. These results are also consistent with our expectation that the influence of political 
connections is more significant in regions with a lower level of law enforcement. 
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We also find that the effect of political connections is significantly higher for firms located in 
regions with a low level of law enforcement. Overall, the evidence from both the information 
asymmetry and law enforcement perspectives confirms our main hypothesis that bank 
connections are able to reduce the information asymmetry between borrowing firms and 
banks, which can lead to more favourable bank loan finance and more efficient capital 
allocation by banks. However, political connections help firms to better access external bank 
loans through government intervention, and this effect is more pronounced in regions with 
low law enforcement, which can lead to lower capital allocation efficiency. 
Table 8. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions across information asymmetry and law 
enforcement 
Dependent variable is Loansize 
 High information 
asymmetry 
Low information 
asymmetry 
High law 
enforcement 
Low law 
enforcement 
Bank 0.65***(3.08) 0.24(1.42) 0.32***(2.88) 0.87***(2.91) 
Bank*ROA 5.90***(2.94) 0.51*(1.77) 0.51*(1.95) 1.16***(2.95) 
Political 0.58***(2.57) 0.20**(2.11) 1.05(0.58) 0.24**(2.05) 
Political*ROA -4.05(-1.43) -1.34***(-2.61) -0.56(-0.64) -5.82**(-2.03) 
Chow tests  4.23**
 a
  5.23**
 b
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.42 0.50 0.46 0.38 
Observations 389 341 381 349 
This table reports the results of bank connections and political connections on bank loan finance in firms with 
high versus low information asymmetry, and high versus low law enforcement. Other control variables are also 
included in the regressions. Variables are defined as in previous tables. 
a
 and 
b
 are F-statistics values of Chow tests, revealing the significance of the difference in the coefficients on the 
Bank*ROA and Political*ROA between firms from two subsamples. 
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3.3 Firm shareholder reaction to bank loan announcements  
A natural extension would be to examine the financial implications of both bank and 
political connections on firm value, reflected in market reactions, and to provide 
complementary evidence. If banks extend loans to firms with bank connections, this will 
provide a strong signal to the market that the commitment is credible and the borrowing firms 
are of better quality. Thus, shareholders will value loan contracts with these firms more 
highly than those without. However, politically based lending may not be beneficial to firm 
shareholders, as it is argued that political connections are a rent-seeking tool to extract private 
benefits (Chen et al., 2011a), and could cause capital misallocation by banks, which will lead 
to less efficient investment by firms (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). In this sense, shareholders may 
put a lower value on politically based lending.  
Thus, in this section we apply an event-study method to investigate the effects of bank 
connections and political connections on the market value placed by investors. Specifically, 
the announcement effect is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
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(CARs) around the bank-loan announcements using the market-adjusted excess return model. 
We choose a three-day event window (i.e., -1, +1), and 230 days as the estimation window 
(i.e., -240, -10).   
To apply the CARs to measure the market reaction accurately, we require all shares in 
our sample to have trading information available from 240 days before the bank-loan 
announcements. Thus, we delete 85 observations from our original sample because of 
unavailable trading information. To isolate the market reaction to bank-loan announcements, 
we also delete bank-loan observations where a major event happened during our estimation 
window, including split-share reform (43), chairman or CEO turnover (18) and mergers and 
acquisitions announcements (6). Ultimately, we have 578 bank-loan observations for our 
analysis in this section, and 578 matching CARs observations in total. Empirically, we 
regress CARs around bank-loan announcements against a set of firm characteristics.  
As shown in Table 9 Panel A, the coefficient on Bank is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.28) in column 1. However, in column 2, which 
considers political connections, we find that Political is significantly negatively related to 
CARs. In column 3, where we combine both Bank and Political, the estimated coefficients of 
both variables are quite similar to their individual estimations in the first two columns.  
These results complement our previous findings. In summary, through reducing 
information asymmetry, bank connections facilitate efficient capital allocation and receive 
favourable market reactions. However, lending based on political connections shows a 
negative effect on market reactions, which echoes the findings of Zheng and Zhu (2013), 
because political connections may induce capital misallocation and inefficient investment. 
Thus, our previous results, as well as the results from Table 8, confirm our main hypothesis 
that bank connections differ from political connections in terms of the mechanisms through 
which they affect firm value. 
4.3.4 Bank shareholder reaction to bank loan announcements 
The above analysis shows that firm shareholders respond positively to bank-loan 
announcements concerning firms with bank connections. A natural question would be 
whether this is due to a wealth transfer from banks to firms. We then examine how bank 
shareholders react to these bank loan announcements. On the one hand, banks can reduce 
their monitoring costs and improve their monitoring ability for lending to firms with bank 
connections, so bank shareholders may feel confident about the safety of their lending and 
place more value on these loans. On the other hand, political pressure forces banks to make 
politically based lending, which may not necessarily be consistent with bank shareholders’ 
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interests. Moreover, such politically based lending may also lead to huge non-performing 
loans in China (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). In this sense, bank shareholders may discount the 
value of lending to firms with political connections.  
We also use the event-study method in this section to examine the investor reaction to 
these bank loan announcements. From the initial 730 bank loan announcements, we first 
delete 99 observations because of unavailable trading information, either because lending 
banks are not listed on the stock exchange, or because there is not enough trading information 
for listed banks to calculate CARs. We also delete 65 observations to exclude contamination 
by other major events, leaving 566 observations for empirical analysis. Empirically, we 
regress the three-day CARs of bank shares around bank loan announcements against a set of 
bank characteristics. 
In Table 9 Panel B, which focuses on bank shareholder reactions, we observe quite 
similar results to those reported in Panel A with respect to bank connections. In particular, the 
estimated coefficients on Bank are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while the coefficients on Political are both negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. These results indicate that bank shareholders respond positively when banks extend 
loans to firms with bank connections, but negatively when banks extend loans to firms with 
political connections. Overall, these results are consistent with our predictions that lending 
decisions towards non-SOEs with bank connections are enhanced, while lending decisions 
towards non-SOEs with political connections are further distorted. 
Table 9. The effects of bank connections and political connections on CARs 
Panel A: Dependent variable is the CARs (-1,+1) for firm shareholders around bank-loan announcements 
Bank 0.005**(2.28)  0.006**(2.06) 
Political  -0.022***(-6.95) -0.020***(-6.82) 
Control variables are firm-level characteristics, including return on assets, firm size, tangible assets, board size, 
independent-director ratio, CEO duality, CEO age, CEO tenure, bank loan size, lending bank type and industry 
fixed effects. 
Adjusted R
2
 0.14 0.13 0.14 
Observations 578 578 578 
Panel B: Dependent variable is the CARs (-1,+1) for bank shareholders around bank-loan announcements 
Bank 0.013**(2.04)  0.013**(2.45) 
Political  -0.012**(-2.00) -0.012**(-2.05) 
Control variables are bank-level characteristics, including return on assets, bank size, board size, independent-
director ratio, bank loan size, lending bank type and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R
2
 0.13 0.13 0.15 
Observations 566 566 566 
This table reports the results of the market reaction to bank loan announcements from the perspective of both 
firm shareholders and bank shareholders. The dependent variable is the three-day CARs of both firm shares and 
bank shares around bank loan announcements. Control variables are measured using the values at the end of the 
year before the year of bank loan announcements. 
The T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. ** and *** indicate 
the significance levels at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.3.5 Connections and other bank loan contract terms 
In the previous analysis, we have explored whether and how bank connections and 
political connections affect the bank loan size and capital allocation efficiency (measured by 
the relationship between bank loan size and ROA). As there are other terms in a bank loan 
contract, such as interest rate, maturity and whether the collateral is required, we aim to 
provide evidence on whether and how connections affect other terms, to further our 
understanding about the effect of connections on bank lending decisions. Empirically, we 
replace the dependent variable in equation (1) with a dummy variable for collateral 
requirement, debt maturity and interest rate, and the estimation results are reported in Table 
10. As shown in the first column, we find that both connections can reduce the probability of 
pledging collateral to obtain bank loans, indicating that both connections help firms to reduce 
financing costs. The larger coefficient of Bank compared with that of Political also suggests 
that the effect of bank connections on reducing financing costs is more significant than that of 
political connections. In column 2, we find that political connections are helpful for obtaining 
more short-term loans, which is consistent with the evidence provided by Liu et al. (2016), 
while bank connections facilitate long-term loans, though the effect is insignificant. In 
column 3, we find that neither connection has a significant effect on interest rate level. The 
possible explanation is that during our sample period, the interest rate on bank loans is still 
relatively regulated by the government and banks have less discretion to determine the 
interest rate based on the quality of borrower. Overall, these additional results provide further 
evidence supporting our main finding that bank connections have a greater impact compared 
with political not only on accessing bank loans but also on debt maturity and collateral 
requirement. 
Table 10 The effect of connections on other bank loan contract terms 
Dependent variable Collateral Debt maturity Interest rate 
Bank -0.67**(-2.49) 0.19(1.09) -0.34(-0.77) 
Political -0.43**(-2.21) -0.64***(-3.40) 0.36(0.73) 
Other control variables from equation (1) are included in all regressions 
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2
 0.14 0.06 0.19 
Observations 730 574 151 
This table reports the effects of bank connections and political connections on collateral requirement, debt 
maturity and interest rate. All the variables are defined as in Table 2. 
T-statistics (Z-statistics) (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3.6 Other tests 
If our main argument, that bank connections are able to alleviate information asymmetry 
with banks and reduce banks’ monitoring costs, is valid, then we will expect that firms with 
bank connections are more likely to receive loans for the first time from banks. To provide 
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empirical evidence to verify our expectation, we re-estimate equation (1) by limiting the 
empirical sample to those that are first loan applications. We use the following steps to 
construct our empirical sample. First, from our main sample used in the previous analysis, we 
drop those for repeated loans. Secondly, from the Bank Loan dataset in the CSMAR, we also 
collect unsuccessful bank loan announcements (which only reflect the intention of seeking a 
loan but without the eventual granting of a loan) and limit it to first-time loan applications 
made by our sample of non-SOEs to a particular bank during our sample period from 2003 to 
2010. Then, we combine these bank loan announcements together to form the empirical 
sample. To conduct regression analysis, we create a new dependent variable for this analysis, 
First, which is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is successfully granted and 
0 if the loan is rejected. From the unreported results, we observe that the estimated 
coefficients on Bank and Political, individually and jointly, are all positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that firms with either bank connections or political connections are 
more likely to receive loans for the first time from banks, and that bank connections are more 
important than political connections, reflected by the magnitude and significance of estimated 
coefficients. However, caution should be taken when interpreting our results because some 
firms might have applied for the loans before 2003 (which is the start of our sample), and the 
first loan applications we mentioned above are not actually the real first loan application.  
So far, our analysis focuses on the association between a firm’s bank connections and 
loans granted by all banks. We thus have an additional concern over whether the effect of 
bank connections on obtaining bank loans may be more pronounced in the case of banks in 
which an executive used to work. Since we have argued that bank-connected executives may 
help firms reduce information asymmetry with banks, we thus conjecture that firms that are 
about to negotiate loans with banks can be more direct and influential when the bank-
connected executive used to work at the bank with which the loan is being negotiated. In fact, 
in our sample of 126 bank loans granted to firms with bank connections, there are 70 bank 
loans granted by a former employer and 56 bank loans granted by other banks. The test in this 
section can also confirm the validity of our main argument. To conduct the empirical 
analysis, we focus on the subsample with bank-connected firms only and create a new 
variable. This variable is Lendingbank, which equals 1 if the loan is provided by the 
executive’s former employer banks and 0 otherwise. We then re-estimate equation (1) by 
replacing Bank dummy with this new variable. The unreported results show that the estimated 
coefficient of Lendingbank is 0.04, and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result 
indicates that through mitigating information asymmetry, bank-connected firms are able to 
24 
 
receive more loans from the banks where the firm’s executives used to work, compared with 
the loans they receive from other banks.  
In our previous analysis, we consider both bank connections and political connections 
together in the same regression. We also notice that during our sample, there are 29 
observations with both bank connections and political connections. Thus a natural concern is 
that the observed effects of both connections in the previous tables could be contaminated by 
including these overlaps between bank connections and political connections. To address this 
concern, we repeat all of the previous analysis by excluding these 29 observations and we 
find that the results are quantitatively similar to those reported in the previous tables, which 
further confirms the robustness of our main results.    
4.4 Endogeneity issue 
Our main analysis may face a potential concern over endogeneity due to selection bias, 
since bank-connected or politically connected executives are not randomly distributed among 
our sample firms. In other words, a firm may appoint a bank-connected or politically 
connected executive when the firm is considering entering external capital markets. 
Moreover, whether to establish bank connections or political connections may also be 
determined by banks’ lending decisions. Thus, the association between the presence of bank 
connections/political connections and bank lending decisions partially stems from reverse 
causality. In addition, firms with either bank connections or political connections might have 
other firm-specific characteristics unaccounted for in our model that affect both the 
connection status and bank loan finance. In other words, firms’ bank connections and 
political connections might be correlated with other unobserved variables which will 
potentially bias the results. Although it is difficult to rule out the endogeneity issue 
completely, we attempt to minimize endogeneity concerns in three ways.  
First, we apply the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure and estimate treatment effect 
regressions to correct for endogeneity, which has been used by Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Chen et al. (2011b), and Wu et al. (2012). The first stage of the procedure involves a probit 
analysis where a bank (political) connection dummy is regressed against the same control 
variables from the bank loan equation. To meet the exclusion restrictions, we also include 
three variables that we do not include in the second-stage regression, by examining the 
Chinese institutional settings. The first two variables are Industry and Region, which we used 
in Table 7 to divide the full sample into subsamples. Specifically, Industry is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for firms from more supported industries and 0 otherwise, and Region is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for firms located in more developed regions and 0 otherwise. The 
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third variable is the log of the amount of bank loans, which is included to test for a potential 
reverse causation. We obtain the inverse mills ratio (Lambda) from the first stage and include 
it as an independent variable in the second stage regression analysis of bank loan finance. We 
report the results of the first stage in Panel A of Table 11, and report the variables of interest 
of the second stage in Panel B of Table 11. First, from the first stage we find that firms from 
less supported industries are likely to establish bank connections, while firms from less 
developed regions are likely to establish political connections. Then in the second-stage 
results, we observe that across three specifications, the Lambda are all significantly negative, 
indicating that unobserved variable bias and the endogeneity issue might exist in the previous 
analysis. After correcting for these endogeneity issues, bank connections can also enhance 
banks’ lending decisions while political connections may weaken the incentive of banks to 
grant loans to financially healthier firms.  
Secondly, if an executive with either bank connections or political connections is 
appointed to facilitate bank loan finance, the deal is likely to be announced shortly after this 
executive’s appointment. Therefore, following the method applied by Huang et al. (2014), we 
limit our empirical sample to observations that are less prone to endogeneity bias by 
excluding observations in which a bank or politically connected executive’s tenure is less 
than three years. Our results remain robust. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the 
results here. 
       
Table 11. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions (Heckman two-stage analysis)  
Panel A: The first stage of Heckman 
 Bank connections Political connections 
ROA 3.15(1.53) 2.61(1.58) 
Firmage 0.05(1.51) 0.22***(5.33) 
Size -0.64***(-4.08) -0.28*(-1.74) 
Leverage 1.96***(2.81) 2.84***(3.68) 
Tangible -1.30**(-2.22) 0.29(0.45) 
Volatility 0.12(0.67) 0.66***(4.30) 
Employee 0.04(0.44) -0.55***(-4.65) 
Indep 2.51(1.43) 5.58***(2.57) 
Duality -0.40(-0.97) -0.84(-1.62) 
Bigfour 4.52***(4.44) 8.03***(6.01) 
Repeat -1.09***(-3.53) -1.12***(-3.83) 
Exeage 0.09***(4.05) 0.10***(4.41) 
Tenure 0.27***(2.96) -0.31***(-3.15) 
Education 0.02(0.30) 0.02(0.87) 
BankROA 3.03(0.19) 5.83***(3.31) 
Bankboard -4.33***(3.10) 4.74***(3.19) 
Industry -0.56**(-2.03) 0.31(1.11) 
Region -0.08(-0.29) -0.72**(-2.34) 
Loansize 5.80***(2.84) 7.78***(2.60) 
Constant 12.98***(2.63) -19.77***(-3.86) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.37 0.59 
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Observation 730 730 
Panel B: The second stage of the Heckman and the dependent variable is Loansize 
Bank 0.09(1.61)  0.11*(1.78) 
Bank*ROA 0.85**(1.99)  0.91**(2.07) 
Political  0.11(0.76) 0.08(0.60) 
Political*ROA  -0.07**(-2.04) -0.45**(-2.28) 
LambdaBank -1.58***(-4.76)  -1.11***(-3.31) 
LambdaPolitical  -2.93***(-7.29) -2.53***(-6.21) 
Control variables from the bank loan finance equation are also included in each regression.  
Adjusted R
2
 0.41 0.42 0.46 
Observations 730 730 730 
Panel A and Panel B of this table reports the Heckman two-stage analysis results of bank connections and 
political connections on bank loan finance after correcting for possible selection bias. LambdaBank and 
LambdaPolitical are inverse mills ratios obtained from the first stages. Variables are defined as in previous tables. 
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Thirdly, we address the endogeneity issue using the propensity score matching method, 
which is consistent with Faccio et al. (2006). In the matching process, for each observation in 
the treatment sample (i.e., those observations with connections), we identify an observation in 
the control sample (i.e., those observations without connections) with the same/nearest 
propensity score of firm characteristics including firm size, leverage, tangibility, volatility, 
employment, and board independence. As we are concerned about both bank connections and 
political connections, we conduct the matching process two times for each connection. This 
procedure leads to 180 observations when we match on the bank connections and 356 
observations when we match on the political connections. When we consider both 
connections in the same regression, we merge these two matching samples and the sample 
size is 476. The slight difference in the size of the merged sample is due to the fact that some 
observations in the control samples are overlapped. First, to validate our matching process, 
we conduct the difference tests of these firm characteristics between connected firms and 
non-connected firms and report the results in Panels A and B of Table 12. We find that the 
differences of these firm characteristics are not significant. Then, we report the regression 
results using the matching samples in Panel C of Table 12. The estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms are significant which are consistent with our main findings. The results 
suggest that after controlling for the endogeneity issue using the propensity score matching 
method, bank connection enhances the positive relationship between bank loan size and 
profitability and political connection weakens the positive relationship between bank loan 
size and profitability. 
 
Table 12. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions (Propensity score matching method) 
Panel A: Difference tests of firm characteristics between firms with and without bank connections 
 Bank connections No bank connections Difference (t-value) 
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Size 21.08 21.06 0.02(0.25) 
Leverage 51.83% 52.25% -0.42%(0.22) 
Tangible 41.76% 39.58% 2.18%(0.83) 
Volatility 1.72 1.79 -0.07(-0.34) 
Employee 6.26 6.36 -0.10(-0.84) 
Indep 29.16% 27.47% 1.69%(0.91) 
Panel B: Difference tests of firm characteristics between firms with and without political connections 
 Political connections No political connections Difference (t-value) 
Size 21.53 21.49 0.04(0.36) 
Leverage 48.59% 49.82% -0.23%(-0.63) 
Tangible 45.87% 50.33% -4.46%(-0.91) 
Volatility 1.73 1.85 -0.12(-0.87) 
Employee 6.15 6.29 -0.14(-1.39) 
Indep 27.92% 25.58% 2.34%(1.47) 
Panel C: Propensity score matching method regression results 
Bank 0.02(0.74)  -0.01(-0.53) 
Bank*ROA 0.15**(2.02)  0.09*(1.83) 
Political  0.01(1.46) 0.01(0.20) 
Political*ROA  -0.11***(-2.66) -0.10***(-2.90) 
Control variables from the bank loan finance equation are also included in each regression.  
Adjusted R
2
 0.29 0.16 0.18 
Observations 180 356 476 
Panel A and Panel B of this table reports the difference tests of firm characteristics between connected firms and 
non-connected firms. Panel C of this table reports the regression results using the propensity score matching 
method. In Panel C, T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
5. Ex-post performance 
Previous analysis concludes that lending to firms with bank connections allocates capital 
much more efficiently due to less information asymmetry and improved bank monitoring, 
while politically based lending is regarded as a form of capital misallocation (Zheng and Zhu, 
2013). However, no direct evidence has been presented with respect to the consequence of 
individual loans. This section provides further empirical evidence regarding the ex-post 
performance of each bank loan to complement our previous findings. As suggested by 
Engelberg et al. (2012), the ideal test would be to compare the default rate (reflecting the 
potential risk levels) between relationship-based and non-relationship-based loans. However, 
the CSMAR does not provide data on whether the loan is defaulted subsequently. Thus, in the 
spirit of Qian and Yeung (2014), we use the probability that a firm will subsequently be 
flagged with ST or *ST, and its stock returns after the loan is granted, to approximately 
measure the ex-post performance of bank loans. In this section, we create a variable, ST, 
which is equal to 1 if a firm has been flagged with ST or *ST since the origination of the 
bank loan and 0 otherwise. According to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), a listed firm will be flagged with ST if this firm has shown a negative net income 
for two consecutive years. If an ST firm fails to recover, the flag will be changed to *ST as a 
warning of delisting. In relation to future stock returns, we collect stock returns 12, 24 and 36 
28 
 
months after the initiation of bank loans and regress on our key variable and a set of control 
variables. These results are reported in Table 13.  
Before proceeding, we note one important change to the sample. In the previous analysis, 
the unit of observation was the individual bank loans, which occasionally included multiple 
tranches within a bank (in the same year to different borrowers) or multiple tranches within a 
firm (in the same year from different banks). Following previous studies using loan-level data 
(Engelberg et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012), we treated these as independent observations in 
our previous analysis. However, this becomes inappropriate when examining firm-level 
performance. Even if a firm borrows multiple loans from the same bank in the same year, this 
clearly constitutes only one independent observation for the firm’s ex-post performance. 
Collapsing at the loan level reduces the sample to 274 when using the probability of entering 
financial distress and future stock returns as the dependent variables.  
In column 1 of Table 13, the dependent variable is the probability of being flagged with 
ST and *ST. From the estimation results, we observe that the coefficients on Bank and 
Political are -1.62 and 0.86, both significant at either the 1% or 5% levels (t-values are -3.30 
and 1.96, respectively). These results indicate that firms with bank connections are less likely 
to become financially troubled, while firms with political connections are more likely. In 
columns 2 to 4 of Table 13, the dependent variable is future stock returns, defined as the 
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns on the basis of monthly stock returns. As 
can be seen, the estimated coefficients on Bank are all positive and statistically significant 
(except for the 36-month regression), indicating that over the long-term windows returns are 
predictable from a firm’s connections with the lending banks. However, this effect tends to 
disappear slightly over a three-year window. The overall results are consistent with our 
previous findings that loans to firms with bank connections are highly efficient and beneficial 
to firm shareholders. In relation to political connections, all three columns show that returns 
for politically connected firms are lower than those for non-politically connected firms. This 
is consistent with our prediction that, though political connections bring more bank loans, 
investors tend to discount the values of these bank loans. This is because firms are expected 
to return the favour to government, such as bribing government officials or paying more tax, 
in exchange for obtaining favourable bank loans, which may offset the benefits of political 
connections. In addition, the subsequent expropriation would be more severe if a loan is 
granted to firms with political connections.   
Table 13. Bank connections, political connections and ex-post performance 
Dependent variable Probability of 
becoming ST or ST* 
Future stock returns 
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  12-months 24-months 36-months 
Bank -1.62***(-3.30) 0.07**(3.07) 0.17**(3.97) 0.09(0.88) 
Political 0.86**(1.96) -0.08***(-3.52) -0.08***(-2.04) -0.10***(-1.97) 
Control variables from equation (1) are also included in these regressions 
Observations 274 274 274 274 
Adjusted R
2
 0.33 0.17 0.16 0.14 
This table relates firms’ probability of entering financial distress and future stock returns of the borrower to 
bank connections and political connections. The control variables from our equation (1) are also included in all 
regressions. 
The T-statistics (Z-statistics) (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** 
and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The objective of this study is to examine the financial implications of firms’ connections 
with both banks and governments for banks' lending decisions. Using bank loan level data 
between 2003 and 2010, we find that the amount of bank loans is more closely related to 
profitability for firms with bank connections, while bank loans granted to firms with political 
connections are less influenced by firm profitability. We also find that the impact of bank 
connections on bank lending decisions becomes more pronounced in less supported industries 
and less developed regions. Further analysis also shows that while bank-connected executives 
can use their financial skills to access more bank loans, their effect on mitigating information 
asymmetry is significantly larger. This evidence supports our argument that bank connections 
can alleviate severe information asymmetry and interest conflicts between firms and banks 
and reduce bank monitoring costs, which may result from ideological discrimination and 
market failure.  
With regard to market reactions to bank-loan announcements, we find that both firm and 
bank investors are optimistic about announcements of bank loans granted to firms with bank 
connections, while they discount the value of bank loans granted to firms with political 
connections. Furthermore, borrowers with bank connections are much less likely to become 
financially distressed, and they exhibit higher future stock returns, once their bank loans are 
initiated, while borrowers with political connections are significantly more likely to become 
financially distressed, and they exhibit lower future stock returns. Additional analysis further 
suggests that the effect of bank connections becomes more profound when firms borrow from 
banks where firm executives used to work.    
Overall, we argue that in an emerging market, where the financial and legal system is 
underdeveloped and legal protection for creditors and investors is weak, bank connections 
can be a substitute for legal protection, and effectively alleviate information asymmetry and 
improve capital allocation efficiency. However, political connections are exploited through 
exerting political pressure, which may not reduce the credit risk and could lead to capital 
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misallocation. Our evidence helps to explain the coexistence of a weak institutional 
framework and vibrant private-sector growth in China.  
 
 
Appendix 1. Identification of supported industries 
Panel A: The tenth Five-Year Plan 
The following industries are included in the tenth Five-Year Plan as supported industries: A01 Agriculture, 
A03 Forestry, A05 Livestock farming, A07 Fishery, A09 Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock farming, Fishery, B 
Mining, C43 Chemical material and products manufacturing, C47 Chemical fibre production, C48 Rubber 
production, C49 Plastic production, C51 Electric-parts manufacturing, C67 Ferrous-metal foundries and 
presses, C69 Metal production, C73 Special-equipment manufacturing, C75 Transportation-equipment 
manufacturing, C76 Electric-equipment manufacturing, C81 Medicine manufacturing, C85 Biological products, 
D01 Electricity, steam and hot-water production and supply, D03 Gas production and supply, E01 Civil-
engineering building, F01 Railway transportation, F03 Highway transportation, F05 Pipeline transportation, 
F07 Waterway transportation, F09 Air transportation, G81 Telecommunication and equipment manufacturing, 
G85 Telecommunication service, G87 Computer application and service, J01 Real estate management, H11 
Retail.  
Panel B: The eleventh Five Year Plan 
The following industries are included in the eleventh Five-Year Plan as supported industries: A01 Agriculture, 
A03 Forestry, A05 Livestock farming, A07 Fishery, A09 Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock farming, Fishery, 
C01 Food processing, C43 Chemical material and products manufacturing, C51 Electric-parts manufacturing, 
C67 Ferrous-metal foundries and presses, C73 Special-equipment manufacturing, C75 Transportation-
equipment manufacturing, C76 Electric-equipment manufacturing, C81 Medicine manufacturing, C85 
Biological products, D01 Electric power, steam and hot-water production and supply, D03 Gas production and 
supply, F01 Railway transportation, F03 Highway transportation, F05 Pipeline transportation, F07 Waterway 
transportation, F09 Air transportation, F11 Transportation auxiliary, G81 Telecommunication and equipment 
manufacturing, G85 Telecommunication service, G87 Computer application and service, J01 Real estate 
management, K01 Public service, K34 Tourism. 
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